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Abstract
In private-value auction environments, Chung and Ely (2007) establish
maxmin and Bayesian foundations for dominant-strategy mechanisms. We
first show that similar foundation results for ex post mechanisms hold true
even with interdependent values if the interdependence is only cardinal.
This includes, for example, the one-dimensional environments of Dasgupta
and Maskin (2000) and Bergemann and Morris (2009b). Conversely, if the
environment exhibits ordinal interdependence, which is typically the case
with multi-dimensional environments (e.g., a player’s private information
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comprises a noisy signal of the common value of the auctioned good and an
idiosyncratic private-value parameter), then in general, ex post mechanisms
do not have foundation. That is, there exists a non-ex-post mechanism
that achieves strictly higher expected revenue than the optimal ex post
mechanism, regardless of the agents’ higher-order beliefs.
1 Introduction
The recent literature on mechanism design provides a series of studies on the ro-
bustness of mechanisms, motivated by the idea that a desirable mechanism should
not rely too heavily on the agents’ common knowledge structure.1 One approach
taken in the literature is to adopt stronger solution concepts that are insensi-
tive to various common knowledge assumptions. For instance, in private-value
environments, Segal (2003) studies dominant-strategy incentive compatible sales
mechanisms. In interdependent-value environments, Dasgupta and Maskin (2000)
study efficient auction rules that are independent of the details under the concept
of ex post incentive compatibility.
However, a mechanism that achieves desired outcomes without the agents’
common knowledge assumption does not immediately imply dominant-strategy or
ex post incentive compatibility. In revenue maximization in private-value auction
(under “regularity” conditions), Chung and Ely (2007) fill in this gap by estab-
lishing the maxmin and Bayesian foundation of the optimal dominant-strategy
mechanism, in the following sense. Consider a situation where the seller in an
auction (principal) only knows a joint distribution of the bidders’ (agents) valua-
1See, for example, Wilson (1985).
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tion profile for the auctioned object, which may be based on data about similar
auctions in the past. On the other hand, he does not have reliable information
about the bidders’ beliefs about each other’s value. For example, the bidders
may have more or less information than the seller, or may simply have a “wrong”
belief (from the seller’s point of view) for various reasons. Thus, the seller’s ob-
jective is to find a mechanism that achieves a good amount of revenue regardless
of the bidders’ (higher-order) beliefs. Note that, in a dominant-strategy mecha-
nism, it is always an equilibrium for each bidder to report his true value, and
therefore, it always guarantees the same level of expected revenue. On the oth-
er hand, in non-dominant-strategy mechanisms, expected revenue may vary with
the bidders’ (higher-order) beliefs. In the definition of Chung and Ely (2007),
there is a maxmin foundation for a dominant-strategy mechanism if, for any non-
dominant-strategy mechanism, there is a possible belief of the seller with which
the dominant-strategy mechanism achieves (weakly) higher expected revenue than
the non-dominant-strategy mechanism.2
In this paper, we examine the existence of such foundations for ex post in-
centive compatible mechanisms in interdependent-value environments. Our main
observation is that the key property that guarantees such foundations is what we
call the cardinal vs. ordinal interdependence. To explain these concepts, imagine
an auction problem, where each bidder’s willingness-to-pay depends both on his
own type and the other bidders’ types. If one type of each bidder always has a
higher valuation for the good than another type regardless of the other bidders’
2 As a stronger concept, if the same belief can be found for any non-dominant-strategy mech-
anism with which a dominant-strategy mechanism achieves (weakly) higher expected revenue,
then there is a Bayesian foundation, because, as long as the seller is Bayesian rational and has
that particular belief, he finds it optimal to offer a dominant-strategy mechanism, even though
he can also offer any other mechanism.
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types (even if each type’s valuation itself may vary with the others’ types), then we
say that the environment exhibits only cardinal interdependence. Conversely, if
the types cannot be ordered in such a uniform manner with respect to the others’
types, then we say that the environment exhibits ordinal interdependence.3
We first show that, in the environments with only cardinal interdependence,
(both maxmin and Bayesian) foundations exist for ex post mechanisms. This
includes, for example, private-value environments (in this sense, our result is a
generalization of Chung and Ely (2007)), and the one-dimensional environments
of Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Bergemann and Morris (2009b).
Conversely, if the environment exhibits ordinal interdependence, which is typ-
ically the case with multi-dimensional environments (e.g., a player’s private infor-
mation comprises a noisy signal of the common value of the auctioned good and
an idiosyncratic private-value parameter), then in general, ex post mechanisms do
not have foundation. That is, there exists a non-ex-post mechanism that achieves
strictly higher expected revenue than the optimal ex post mechanism, regardless
of the agents’ higher-order beliefs.
Regarding the foundation results, Chen and Li (2018) consider a general class
of private-value environments where agents have multi-dimensional payoff types,
and show that if the environment satisfies the uniform-shortest-path-tree property,
then the maxmin (and Bayesian) foundation exists for dominant-strategy mech-
anisms. This property simply means that, for any allocation rule the principal
3 These interdependence concepts are obviously related to the “size” of interdependence (e.g.,
private-value environments are special cases of cardinally interdependent cases). However, they
are not necessarily corresponding to each other. For example, if a bidder’s valuation in an
auction is a sum of a function only of his own type and another function of the others’ types,
then however large is the second term, the environment never exhibits ordinal interdependence.
In this sense, a more appropriate interpretation is that these interdependent concepts are related
to the diversity of interdependence across types.
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desires to implement, the set of binding constraints is invariant. This holds true
in the single-good auction environment of Chung and Ely (2007) with regularity,
and in this sense, their result generalizes that of Chung and Ely (2007), keeping
the private-value assumption. Our work is a complement to Chen and Li (2018)
in that we consider interdependent-value environments. For our foundation re-
sult (Theorem 1), a similar property to their uniform-shortest-path-tree property
holds, which suggests that some of their argument may be applicable even in
interdependent-value environments.
Regarding the no-foundation results, there are several papers in the litera-
ture that provide examples or a restrictive class of environments in which (var-
ious versions of) foundations for dominant-strategy or ex post mechanisms do
not exist. For example, for interdependent-value environments, Bergemann and
Morris (2005) provide examples in the context of implementation of certain (“non-
separable”) social choice correspondences, and Jehiel, Meyer-ter Vehn, Moldovanu,
and Zame (2006) provide an example for revenue maximization in sequential
sales. Chen and Li (2018) also provide an instance of environment where, with-
out their uniform-shortest-path-tree property, there might not exist a foundation
for dominant-strategy mechanisms, even in private-value environments. Our work
contributes to this line of research by providing a class of environments with a no-
foundation result (and sufficient conditions on the primitives in that environment),
and the economic intuition based on the cardinal vs. ordinal interdependence.
Other closely related papers include Bergemann and Morris (2005) and Börgers
(2017). In interdependent-value environments, Bergemann and Morris (2005) show
that any separable social choice correspondence that is implementable given any
(higher-order) belief structure of the agents must satisfy ex post incentive compat-
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ibility. In this sense, they provide another sort of foundation for ex post incentive
compatible mechanisms. Their separable social choice correspondence necessarily
admits a unique non-monetary allocation for each payoff-type profile, and hence,
in general, excludes revenue maximization as the principal’s objective. Thus, our
work is complementary to theirs in that we consider revenue maximization.
Börgers (2017) criticizes the foundation theorems by constructing a non-dominant-
strategy (or more generally, a non-ex-post) mechanism that yields weakly higher
expected revenue than the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism for any belief
structure of the agents, while it yields strictly higher expected revenue for some
belief structures. Our no-foundation result is stronger in that it provides a strict
improvement in expected revenue for any (higher-order) belief structure, though
under stronger conditions on the environment.
One may wonder how the “generic constancy” result by Jehiel, Meyer-ter Vehn,
Moldovanu, and Zame (2006) is related (if any) to our foundation or no-foundation
results. Recall that, for their result, a crucial assumption is that each agent’s
relative valuation — the difference in valuation between any two alternatives —
is everywhere strictly responsive to one’s own signal. This is perhaps a reasonable
assumption for example in a voting environment, but typically violated in “private-
goods” environments such as in auction (see Bikhchandani (2006) more about this
point). In this sense, we think that their result is basically orthogonal to ours.
2 Model
There is a finite set of risk-neutral agents, I = {1, 2, . . . , I}. Agent i’s privately-
known payoff type is θi ∈ Θi ⊆ Rd, where we assume |Θi| = N for each i as
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in Chung and Ely (2007). A payoff-type profile is written as θ = (θ1, . . . , θI) ∈
Θ1 × . . . × ΘI = Θ. The principal’s (subjective) prior belief for θ is given by
f ∈ ∆(Θ), where we assume f(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ.
Each agent i’s willingness-to-pay for qi ∈ Qi ⊆ R+ units of the good is denoted
by vi(qi, θ). We assume that 0 ∈ Qi, |Qi| < ∞,4 vi(0, θ) = 0, and vi(·, θ) is
increasing for all θ. Moreover, as a standard single-crossing condition, we assume
that:
Assumption 0. For each θi 6= θ′i, and θ−i, we have either
vi(qi, θi, θ−i)− vi(q′i, θi, θ−i) > vi(qi, θ′i, θ−i)− vi(q′i, θ′i, θ−i), ∀qi > q′i;
or
vi(qi, θi, θ−i)− vi(q′i, θi, θ−i) < vi(qi, θ′i, θ−i)− vi(q′i, θ′i, θ−i), ∀qi > q′i.





Clearly, the payoff environment in this paper includes the standard auction
environment where vi(qi, θi, θ−i) = vi(θi, θ−i)qi. Besides the preferences that are
linear in qi, Assumption 0 also holds for preferences satisfying vi(qi, θi, θ−i) =
gi(θi, θ−i)hi(qi) +Hi(qi, θ−i), where hi(qi) is a monotonic non-negative function.
Our assumption throughout the paper is that≺θ−ii is a total ordering over Θi for
any θ−i, although ≺θ−ii can be different from ≺
θ′−i
i . To see this, consider an auction
environment in which each agent i’s payoff-type comprises (ci, di) ∈ Θi ⊆ R2, where
4 As it becomes clearer, the finiteness of Qi is without loss of generality (though it simplifies
the notation), given that Θ is finite and we only consider finite mechanisms (including ex post
incentive compatible mechanisms).
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ci denotes a “common-value” component and di denotes an idiosyncratic “private-
value” component, and his valuation for the good is πi(c1, . . . , cN) + di for some
function πi strictly increasing in all the arguments.





such that ci < c
′
i and di > d
′
i, it is possible that, given some c−i, (ci, di) has a higher
valuation for the good than (c′i, d
′
i) (i.e., πi(ci, c−i) + di > πi(c
′
i, c−i) + d
′
i), while





are said to exhibit ordinal interdependence.






Paying pi ∈ R to the principal, agent i’s final payoff is vi(qi, θ) − pi. The
principal’s objective is the total revenue,
∑
i pi. The feasible set of q = (q1, . . . , qI)
is denoted byQ ⊆
∏
iQi, where the shape ofQ depends on the specific environment
of interest. For example, auctions, trading, and public-goods environments are in
this class, with (or without) interdependence.
2.1 Type space
The agents’ private information includes their own payoff types, their (first-order)
beliefs about their payoff types, and their arbitrarily higher-order beliefs. To model
this, we introduce type spaces as in Bergemann and Morris (2005).
A (“known-own-payoff-type”) type space, denoted by T = (Ti, θ̂i, π̂i)Ii=1, is a
collection of a measurable space of types Ti for each agent i, a measurable function
θ̂i : Ti → Θi that describes the agent’s payoff type, and a measurable function
π̂i : Ti → ∆(T−i) that describes his belief about the others’ types. Let β̂i(ti)
5 See, for example, Example 5.1 in Jehiel, Meyer-ter Vehn, Moldovanu, and Zame (2006).
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denote the belief hierarchy associated with type ti (i.e., it describes ti’s first-order
belief about θ−i, second-order belief, and so on, up to an arbitrary higher order).
We say that T has no redundant types if for each i, mapping ti 7→ (θ̂i(ti), β̂i(ti)) is
one-to-one.
In fact, there exists a (compact) universal type space T ∗ = (T ∗i , θ̂∗i , π̂∗i )Ii=1, such
that any type space without redundant types can be embedded into it, in the
following sense.6
Lemma 1. Let T be a type space with no redundant types. Then, for each i,
there exist subsets T̂i ⊂ T ∗i and bijections hi : Ti → T̂i such that:







ti∈A,t−i∈B dπ̂i(ti)[t−i] for all A ⊆ Ti and
B ⊆ T−i.
where h−i(t−i) = (h1(t1), . . . , hi−1(ti−1), hi+1(ti+1), . . . , hI(tI)).
In what follows, we directly work with this universal type space.7 Specifically,
let µ ∈ ∆(T ∗) represent the principal’s prior belief over T ∗ such that µ({t|θ̂∗(t) =
θ}) = f(θ) for each θ, that is, the principal’s (first-order) belief for θ is given
by f(θ), as assumed above. The other information contained in µ captures the
principal’s belief over the agents’ possible belief structures. Let M ⊆ ∆(T ∗)
represent the set of all such µ.
In some contexts, it may be reasonable to assume that (the principal believes
that) the agents do not have extreme (non-full-support) first-order beliefs. For
6 For constructions of universal type spaces, see Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger
and Dekel (1993).
7 The results would not change even if we allow for type spaces with redundant types, but
the notation would be more involved.
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example, instead of assuming that each agent’s belief or knowledge is exogenous,
one may be interested in a situation where each agent engages in his own infor-
mation acquisition (through which his belief is updated), where the information
acquisition cost is a linear function of relative entropy (Sims (2003)). Then, it is
infinitely costly for each agent to know other agents’ payoff types.
Formally, let Mfull ⊂ M denote the set of µ such that every agent i has a
full-support first-order belief about the other agents. More precisely, for each
agent i with type ti, let π̂
∗1




dπ̂∗i (ti)[t−i] for each θ−i. Then, Mfull is the set of all
µ ∈M such that µ ({t | ∀i, θ−i, π̂∗1i (ti)[θ−i] > 0}) = 1.
2.2 Mechanism
The principal designs a mechanism, denoted by (M, q, p), where Mi represents a
message set for each agent i, M = M1× . . .×MI , q : M → Q is an allocation rule,
and p : M → RI is a payment function. Each agent i reports a message mi ∈ Mi
simultaneously, and then he receives qi(m) units of the good and pays pi(m) to





= (0, 0) for any m−i ∈M−i.
The mechanism together with the universal type space T ∗ (subject to the
principal’s belief µ) constitute an incomplete information game. Let σ∗ = (σ∗i )i∈I
denote the corresponding equilibrium under certain solution concept, where σ∗i :
T ∗i →Mi is agent i’s equilibrium strategy. The expected revenue of mechanism Γ
10








First, we define the Bayesian incentive compatible (hereafter BIC for short)
mechanism. By revelation principle for Bayesian equilibrium (with T ∗), we restrict
attention to direct mechanisms with truth-telling equilibrium.
Definition 2. A BIC mechanism is a mechanism Γ = (M, q, p) such that, for each
i, (i) Mi = T
∗























denoted by BIRti and BIC
t→t′
i , respectively.
We now introduce a class of mechanisms with ex post incentive compatibility
(an EPIC mechanism for short).
Definition 3. An EPIC mechanism is a mechanism Γ = (M, q, p) such that, for
each i, (i) Mi = Θi, and (ii) for each θ ∈ Θ and θi 6= θ′i ∈ Θi:
vi(qi(θ), θ)− pi(θ) ≥ 0,






The expected revenue in the truth-telling (ex post) equilibrium in an EPIC
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Note that this does not depend on µ, and in this sense, Rf (Γ) may be inter-
preted as a “robustly guaranteed” expected revenue with respect to the agents’
beliefs and higher-order beliefs. Let REPf denote the maximum expected revenue
among all EPIC mechanisms.
Applying the standard argument, the optimal mechanism among all EPIC
mechanisms is characterized by the corresponding virtual-value maximization. To





f(θ̃i | θ−i) denote the cumulative distribu-
tion function of i’s payoff types conditional on the other agents’ payoff-type profile
being θ−i.
Agent i’s virtual valuation at payoff-type profile θ is given by:
γi(qi, θ) = vi(qi, θ)−
1− Fi(θi | θ−i)
f(θi | θ−i)
(
v+i (qi, θ)− vi(qi, θ)
)
,
where v+i (qi, θi, θ−i) = minθ̃i
θ−i
i θi
vi(qi, θ̃i, θ−i) whenever the right-hand side is well-
defined; otherwise γi(qi, θ) = vi(qi, θ). Because vi(0, θ) = 0, we have γi(0, θ) = 0.









s.t. ∀i, θi, θ′i, θ−i :
θi θ−ii θ′i ⇒ qi(θi, θ−i) ≥ qi(θ′i, θ−i). (M)
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We assume that the solution exists in this maximization problem, which we
denote by qEP = (qEPi (θ))i,θ. The corresponding payment rule is denoted by
pEP = (pEPi (θ))i,θ.
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Let Q+i = {qi ∈ Qi | ∃θ ∈ Θ s.t. qi = qEPi (θ)} for each i (which is a finite








|vi(qi, θi, θ−i) + vi(q′i, θ′i, θ−i)− vi(q′i, θi, θ−i)− vi(qi, θ′i, θ−i)|,
then we have η > 0 due to Assumption 0 and the finiteness of I, Θ and (Q+i )i∈I .
In particular, this implies that, by taking 0 = q′i < qi ∈ Q+i , we have
|vi(qi, θi, θ−i)− vi(qi, θ′i, θ−i)| ≥ η
for all θi 6= θ′i and θ−i.
The following notation is extensively used in the subsequent analysis. For each
i and qi > 0, define
Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) = {θi ∈ Θi|qEPi (θi, θ−i) ≥ qi}
as the set of i’s payoff types whose allocation given θ−i is greater than or equal to qi
in the optimal EPIC mechanism. Note that, by monotonicity, if θi ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) and





pEPi (θ) = vi(q
EP
i (θ), θ);
(ii) otherwise, letting θ′i ≺
θ−i











pEPi (θ) = vi(q
EP




i θi, then θ
′
i ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i). Let θ∗i (qi, θ−i) be the lowest element in Θ∗i (qi, θ−i)





This θ∗i (qi, θ−i) is called i’s threshold type with respect to qi given θ−i. Finally, let
Θ∗−i(qi, θi) = {θ−i ∈ Θ−i|θi ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i)}
denote the set of θ−i with which θi is allocated greater than or equal to qi units in
the optimal EPIC mechanism.
2.3 Foundations
For a non-EPIC mechanism, expected revenue may vary with the agents’ belief
structure, and the principal—who does not know the agents’ belief structure—may
not want to offer a mechanism if the expected revenue is low for some possible
belief structures. Following Chung and Ely (2007), we say that there is a maxmin
foundation for EPIC mechanisms if, for any non-EPIC mechanism Γ = (M, q, p),
there exists µ ∈ M such that, for any Bayesian equilibrium σ∗, the expected






∗(t))dµ ≤ REPf .
If there exists a single µ ∈M that achieves the above inequality for all Γ, then
we say that there is a Bayesian foundation for EPIC mechanisms.9
In the context where (the principal believes that) the agents have full-support
9 These definitions are consistent with the verbal explanations of the corresponding definitions
in Chung and Ely (2007). However, in fact, the mathematical definitions of them in Chung and
Ely (2007) are slightly different: for example, their mathematical definition of maxmin foundation
14
first-order beliefs, we replaceM byMfull in the above definitions, and we say that
there is a strong maxmin / Bayesian foundation for EPIC mechanisms.
3 Without ordinal interdependence






i . This includes
the private-value environment (as in Chung and Ely (2007)) as a special case, but
also includes some interdependent-value environments. For example, assume that
Θi ⊆ R and vi(qi, θi, θ−i) is an increasing function of θi for each given qi, θ−i.
Because i’s payoff is affected by θ−i, the environment exhibits interdependence,
but it is only cardinal interdependence in the sense that a higher value of θi
corresponds to a higher type with respect to ≺θ−ii for any θ−i.
We further assume the following “regularity” condition in the same spirit as in
Chung and Ely (2007).
Assumption 1. There exists ε > 0 such that, for any distribution over Θ, f̃ , such
that ‖f̃ − f‖ < ε (in a Euclidean distance), the monotonicity constraints (M) are














To see the difference, let R(µ) denote the term inside the bracket on the left-hand side (i.e., the
expected revenue given µ), and imagine a case where (i) R(µ) > REPf for any µ, while (ii) for any
ε > 0, there exists µ such that R(µ)− ε < REPf . That is, the non-EPIC mechanism Γ is a strict
improvement over the optimal EPIC mechanism, while it is not a uniform improvement. The
verbal definition of Chung and Ely (2007) (which we follow in this paper) suggests that there is
no maxmin foundation, while their mathematical definition says there is. The difference is not
innocuous, because the non-EPIC mechanism we propose is indeed such a mechanism.
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not binding in the problem of REP
f̃








Of course, the conditions on the environment that imply the above assumption
can vary with the environment. For example, in an auction environment with
Q = {q ∈ {0, 1}I |
∑
i qi ≤ 1}, the regularity assumption is satisfied if, for any
i ∈ I, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , I} \ {i} , and θ, we have
γi(θ) ≥ γj(θ)⇒ ∀θ′i i θi, γi(θ′i, θ−i) > γj(θ′i, θ−i), (1)
where γ0(θ) = 0. In a digital-good environment
10 of Goldberg, Hartline, Karlin,
Saks, and Wright (2006) with Q = {0, 1}I , the regularity assumption is satisfied
under the strict monotone hazard rate condition, i.e., for each i and θ, 1−Fi(θi|θ−i)
f(θi|θ−i)
is decreasing in θi. In a multi-unit sales environment as in Mussa and Rosen
(1978), the regularity assumption is satisfied under the strict monotone hazard
rate condition and concavity of each vi with respect to qi.
Remark 1. Chung and Ely (2007) call (1) the single-crossing condition in private-
value environments. They show that if Θi = {θ1i , . . . , θMi } satisfying θmi − θm−1i =
γ > 0 for each m, then condition-(1) is implied by the strict monotone hazard rate
property, together with affiliation in f (which includes independent f as a special
case). When there is no ordinal interdependence, we show in Appendix F.1 that
10The seller can replicate arbitrarily many copies of the digital goods with negligible costs.
Moreover, each copy of the digital goods is completely identical with the original one. Examples
of digital goods can be computer software, databases, blueprints, DNA sequences, visual images,
music, recipes, ideas and so on. Since the seller is no longer subject to the feasibility constraints
in digital-goods auction, she sells to an agent if and only if his virtual value is nonnegative.
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condition-(1) is also satisfied in interdependent-value environment if we further
impose three mild restrictions on valuation functions: vi is increasing and concave
in each argument, supermodular, and satisfies that an increase in an agent’s payoff
type has a larger effect on his own valuation function than on any other agent’s.
An example that satisfies these conditions is that, vi(θ) = θi + α
∑
j 6=i θj with
0 < α < 1, for all i.
Generalizing Chung and Ely (2007) (for private-value auction environments),
we show that no ordinal interdependence implies the strong maxmin / Bayesian
foundations for EPIC mechanisms.
Theorem 1. With Assumption 1 and no ordinal interdependence, EPIC mecha-
nisms have the strong Bayesian (and hence strong maxmin) foundation.
Our proof for Theorem 1 is a direct extension of Chung and Ely (2007) in
the private-value setting to the interdependent-value environment. We provide a
sketch of the proof here, and the formal proof in the Appendix.
First, we impose the non-singularity condition on the payoff-type distribu-
tion f , which says that f satisfies certain full-rank conditions, and consider the
Bayesian mechanism design problem with a simple type space having a particular
belief structure. We show that under such a belief structure, it is without loss
of generality to treat all participation constraints and all “adjacent downward”
incentive constraints with equality, and ignore all the other constraints. Then we
show that the total expected revenue in this Bayesian problem is maximized by
the optimal EPIC mechanism.
The next step is to relax the non-singularity assumption by choosing a sequence
of non-singular distributions which converge to the given payoff-type distribution.
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Since the optimal EPIC mechanisms achieve the highest expected revenue over the
sequence of simple type spaces with the particular belief structure, by taking the
limit, we show that the Bayesian foundation also exists for any arbitrary payoff-
type distribution, as long as Assumption 1 is satisfied.11
4 With ordinal interdependence
4.1 No strong foundations
We first illustrate by two examples how ordinal interdependence could undermine
the foundations of using the optimal EPIC mechanism.
Example 1. Consider a two-agent digital-goods environment, where I = 2, Θ1 =
Θ2 = {1, 2}, and Q = {0, 1}2. We focus on agent 1 because the designer decides
allocation rules for each agent separately in digital-goods environments. Table 1
collects payoff-type distribution f , agent 1’s valuation and virtual value at each
payoff type profile, and the corresponding optimal EPIC allocation for agent 1. For
agent 2, assume that v2(θ) = θ2 + 1 for all θ so that the optimal EPIC allocation
for him is (qEP2 (θ), p
EP
2 (θ)) = (1, 2) for all θ.
Table 1: Auction environment of Example 1.








, 2, 2, (1, 1) 1
6






, (1, 1) 1
3
, 2, 2, (1, 2)
We have Θ∗1(q1, θ2) = {1, 2} if (q1, θ2) = (1, 1) and Θ∗1(q1, θ2) = {2} if (q1, θ2) =
(1, 2). Hence, the threshold payoff type of agent 1 given θ2 = 1 (i.e., θ1 = 2) is
11In Chung and Ely (2007), they show by example that, without the condition corresponding
to Assumption 1, there may not exist a Bayesian foundation.
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assigned the goods given θ2 = 2, but the non-threshold winning payoff type of
agent 1 given θ2 = 1 (i.e., θ1 = 1) is unassigned given θ2 = 2. This reversal of the
order over agent 1’s payoff types is crucial for the no-foundation result.
Now we consider a modification of the optimal EPIC mechanism, which asks
agent 1’s first-order belief. More specifically, agent 1 is asked to report his payoff







If he reports θ1 = 1 and first-order belief y ∈ [0, 1], agent 1 obtains the goods
by paying (2 − cos τ) under θ2 = 1, but fails to get the goods and still needs to
pay (1 − sin τ) under θ2 = 2, where τ = arc tan 1−yy . We keep the optimal EPIC
allocations for both agents in the other cases. It is easy to verify that the new
mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible over the universal type space, since
every type (of the universal type space) is assigned the optimal choice among the
menu of all possible options.12
Because we are interested in the strong foundation, assume that (the principal
believes that) agent 1 always has a full-support first-order belief, that is, y ∈ (0, 1)
with (µ-)probability one. Then, agent 1 with θ1 = 1 always pays strictly more
than 1 regardless of his (full-support) first-order belief and agent 2’s true payoff
type: if θ2 = 1, agent 1 pays 2− cos τ for some τ ∈ (0, π2 ), which is strictly greater
than 1; if θ2 = 2, agent 1 pays 1 − sin τ for some τ ∈ (0, π2 ), which is strictly
greater than 0. Therefore, this new mechanism raises strictly higher expected
12More precisely, an option for agent 1 is denoted by
(
q1(1), p1(1); q1(2), p1(2)
)
, meaning that
agent 1’s allocation rule is q1(θ2), and agent 1’s payment is p1(θ2), if agent 2 reports θ2 = 1, 2.
Thus, agent 1 chooses from the menu
{
(1, 2− cos τ ; 0, 1− sin τ) | τ ∈ [0, π2 ]
}
∪ {(1, 1; 1, 2)}.
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revenue than the optimal EPIC mechanism, as long as agent 1 has a full-support
first-order belief.
In this example, the reason why we can increase the payment of θ1 = 1 without
violating all constraints is because: in the optimal EPIC mechanism, EPIC
1→2|θ2
1
is satisfied with strict inequality at θ2 = 2, while EPIR
1|θ2
1 is satisfied with strict
inequality at θ2 = 1. This is possible only when we have ordinal interdependence,
so that different subset of constraints become binding given different θ−i.
13 Thus,
once agent 1’s belief puts strictly positive probability on θ2 = 1 and 2, both
BIC1→21 and BIR
1
1 will become strictly slack in the optimal EPIC mechanism,
leaving room for payment increase. Similar reasoning applies to the next example.
Example 2. Assume I = 2, Θ1 = {0, 1, 2}, Θ2 = {0, 1} and Q = {0, 1}2. Table 2
collects payoff-type distribution f , agent 1’s valuation and virtual value at each
payoff type profile, and the corresponding optimal EPIC allocation for agent 1.
Clearly, agent 1’s preference exhibits ordinal interdependence.
Table 2: Auction environment of Example 2.








, 2, 1, (1, 2) 1
6




, 0, −4, (0, 0) 1
6




, 3, 3, (1, 2) 1
6
, 3, 3, (1, 2)
We have Θ∗1(q1, θ2) = {0, 2} if (q1, θ2) = (1, 0) and Θ∗1(q1, θ2) = {1, 2} if
(q1, θ2) = (1, 1). Hence, neither of these two sets is the subset of the other one,
which never happens when we don’t have ordinal interdependence. Now we con-
struct a new mechanism as follows. When agent 1 reports θ1 = 2 and first-order
13Instead, if there is no ordinal interdependence, we will have the same ranking of payoff types,
and thus the same subset of binding constraints, for all θ−i in the optimal EPIC mechanism.
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belief y (for θ2 = 0), agent 1 obtains the goods by paying (3− cos τ) under θ2 = 0
and obtains the goods by paying (3− sin τ) under θ2 = 1, where τ = arg tan 1−yy .
We keep the optimal EPIC mechanism for both agents in the other cases. As in
Example 1, we can show that the new mechanism is Bayesian incentive compat-
ible over the universal type space. Since we assume full-support beliefs, that is,
y ∈ (0, 1), then the payment from agent 1 is always strictly greater than 2, the
optimal EPIC payment rule, under both θ2 = 0 and θ2 = 1. Thus, the new mech-
anism raises strictly higher expected revenue than the optimal EPIC mechanism
regardless of the designer’s belief, resulting in no maxmin foundation for the EPIC
mechanisms.14
The two examples above identify some cases where revenue improvement is
possible. The common feature of these two cases is that there exists a type of an
agent whose BIC and BIR constraints (given any full-support belief of him about
the other agents) are not binding. Motivated by them, we define the concept of
improvability as follows.
Definition 4 (“Improvability”). Revenue from i is improvable with respect to
(θi, θ−i, θ
′
−i) if there exists qi and q
′
i such that at least one of the following holds:
(i) θi ∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) ∩ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i), and θ∗i (qi, θ−i) /∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i), and θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) /∈
Θ∗i (qi, θ−i);
(ii) θi ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) \Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i), and θ∗i (qi, θ−i) ∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i);
(iii) θi ∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) \Θ∗i (qi, θ−i), and θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i).
14In this example, EPIC
1→2|θ2
1 is binding at θ2 = 1, but is strictly slack at θ2 = 2; meanwhile
EPIC
1→3|θ2
1 is binding at θ2 = 2, but is strictly slack at θ2 = 1. (EPIR
1|θ2
1 always holds with
strict inequality, and thus is irrelevant.) Thus, as long as agent 1 has a full-support first-order
belief, both BIC1→21 and BIC
1→3
1 are not binding in the optimal EPIC mechanism.
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These two examples essentially show that, given the optimal EPIC mechanism,
if the revenue from some agent i is improvable with respect to some (θi, θ−i, θ
′
−i),
then the strong foundation does not exist. We summarize this result in Propo-
sition 1, and provide in Appendix B the formal proof, which directly follows the
ideas of Example 1 and 2.
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 0, improvability implies no strong foundation
of EPIC mechanisms.
From Definition 4, ordinal interdependence is the necessary condition to have





















i (qi, θ−i) and θi ≺
θ′−i
i









θi ≺θ−ii θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) in case (iii). A natural question is when ordinal interdependence
implies improvability, and hence no strong foundations of EPIC mechanisms. We
further assume the following conditions.
Assumption 2 (“Highest Payoff Type”). For each i, there exists θ̄i ∈ Θi such
that, for each θi ∈ Θi and θ−i ∈ Θ−i, we have θ̄i θ−ii θi.
Assumption 3. There exist θi, θ
′
i, θ−i and θ
′




i, θ−i) < q
EP
i (θi, θ−i)









The highest-payoff-type assumption is satisfied if Θ is a complete sublattice in
Rd, and vi(qi, θ) is increasing in θ. Assumption 3 says we can find at least one pair
of agent i’s payoff types such that not only his preference over these two payoff
types get reversed (that is, θ′i ≺
θ−i




i θi), but also the ranking of the
corresponding allocations varies at the same time. Basically Assumption 3 means
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that ordinal interdependence has an influence on the allocation rule in a nontrivial
way.
Assumption 3 is not directly on the primitives, and hence one may wonder if
it is easy to satisfy/check the assumption in any given environment. In the next
subsection, we obtain sufficient conditions that are more directly on the primitives
(or on the objects that easy to compute based on the primitives, such as the agents’
virtual values).
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 0, 2 and 3, EPIC mechanisms have no strong
foundation.
Proof. We first show that Assumptions 2 and 3 jointly lead to improvability. Then
the theorem follows from Proposition 1.
Let qi = q
EP








−i). By Assumption 3, we have θi ∈ Θ
∗
i (qi, θ−i), θ
′
i /∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i);
θi /∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i), θ′i ∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i).
By Assumption 2, there exists θ̄i ∈ Θi such that, for any other θi ∈ Θi and
θ−i ∈ Θ−i, we have θ̄i θ−ii θi. The monotonicity conditions on qEP implies that
qEPi (θ̄i, θ−i) ≥ qEPi (θi, θ−i) for any θi 6= θ̄i. Thus, θ̄i ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i). Similarly,





−i) /∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i), then we get improvability-(i).
If we have θ∗i (qi, θ−i) ∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i), together with θi ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) \ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i)









−i)\Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) we get improvability-(iii). Therefore, improvability is always
implied by Assumptions 2 and 3.
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We conclude this subsection with the following two remarks.
Remark 2. Although Theorem 2 assumes that each agent has a full-support
first-order belief about the other agents (“Mfull”), and hence the result refers to
no strong foundation, this full-support assumption can be omitted if we use an
alternative definition of (no) foundation. Specifically, let us say that the EPIC
mechanism has no foundation if there exists an alternative mechanism which (i)
generates at least a weakly higher expected revenue given any belief hierarchy of
the agents (even including the ones without full-support first-order beliefs), and
(ii) generates a strictly higher expected revenue given some of them (see Börgers
(2017)). Theorem 2 shows that our proposed mechanism in the proof achieves (ii),
but it also achieves (i) as we will see in Section 4.3.
Remark 3. Observe that our improvement over the optimal EPIC mechanism is
solely based on the property that each agent has a full-support first-order belief,
regardless of whether that belief is “correct” or not. Indeed, Theorem 2 holds
true even if we restrict attention to a subset of agents’ beliefs which are consistent
with a common prior: For example, imagine that the agents’ payoff types follow
a joint distribution f (i.e., the principal’s prior belief), there exists an additional
signal space S =
∏
i Si, and a joint distribution over the payoff types and signals
g ∈ ∆(Θ × S) such that g(·, S) = f(·) (i.e., g’s marginal on Θ coincides with f).
This g is interpreted as a common prior in the sense that each agent’s belief about
the others is based on Bayes’ updated belief given his payoff type θi and his signal
si ∈ Si. Imagine that the principal evaluates a mechanism based on the worst-case
expected revenue among all (S, g) which satisfies the above conditions, and we say
that the EPIC mechanism has a strong foundation if for any mechanism, there
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exists a full-support (S, g) with which the optimal EPIC mechanism is (weakly)
better than that mechanism.15 Then, Theorem 2 immediately shows that, under
Assumptions 0, 2, and 3, the EPIC mechanism has no strong foundation.
In this sense, our main logic of improvement is different from the one in Börgers
(2017), whose improvement is based on the mutually beneficial side-bets across
agents with non-common priors.
4.2 A sufficient condition for Assumption 3
The goal of this subsection is to provide sufficient conditions more directly on the
primitives with which Theorem 2 holds. Indeed, the following lemma provides a
set of conditions on the virtual values16 that imply Assumption 3. Together with
Assumptions 0 and 2 (which are already directly on the primitives), Theorem 2
holds.
Lemma 3. Assumption 3 is satisfied if:
(i) If θi ≺θ−ii θ′i, then we have γi(qi, θi, θ−i) ≤ γi(qi, θ′i, θ−i) for all qi;
(ii) There exist i, θi, θ
′
i, θ−i and θ
′












−i) > 0; (c) for any j 6= i, any θ̃i and any qj, we have γj(qj, θ̃i, θ−i) ≤
0 and γj(qj, θ̃i, θ
′
−i) ≤ 0;
(iii) Q is a lower set (i.e., if q ∈ Q and q′ ≤ q, then q′ ∈ Q); and
(iv) for any i, θ, γi(qi, θ) is strictly quasi-concave in qi.
15 Du (2018) and Brooks and Du (2019) studies the worst-case optimal auction mechanisms
in this sense in (pure-)common-value environments.
16 Recall that the virtual values are straightforwardly computed based on the primitives.
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The proof is given in Appendix F.2. Condition-(i) is a standard monotonicity
condition on virtual values, which guarantees that the seller never sells to an agent
with negative virtual value. Condition-(ii) requires that ordinal interdependence
affect the virtual values in a particular way. More specifically, θ−i, θ
′
−i are −i’s
types such that they themselves are not assigned (condition (c)), but important
for i in the sense that i’s virtual value can have opposite signs depending on θ−i
or θ′−i. For example, one may imagine that θ−i, θ
′
−i include important “common
value” information (and hence i’s virtual value crucially depends on it), but −i
have very low “private value” or “idiosyncratic” shocks so that their willingness to
pay are small (and hence have negative virtual values). Condition-(iii) is satisfied
in many environments of private-good assignment, such as in single-unit or multi-
unit auction, bilateral trading, partnership dissolution, and so on. Condition-(iv)
is trivially satisfied if vi is linear in qi (e.g., auction, bilateral trade). It is also
typically satisfied in many multi-unit environment, where the condition, together
with γi(0, θ) = 0, essentially says: If γi(qi, θ) > 0 and 0 < q
′
i < qi, then γi(q
′
i, θ) > 0.
We provide a more concrete example of the conditions in the above lemma in a
single-unit auction context.
Example 3. Consider a single-object auction with two agents and two states.




i ), and his valuation is vi = cjd
(1)
i +
(1 − cj)d(2)i , which depends on his own private-value component and agent j’s
common-value component.17 For simplicity, assume that for i = 1, 2, we have
17Because vi does not depend on ci, any two payoff types with the same private-value compo-
nent will induce the same valuation, thus Assumption 0 is violated in this example. However,
by allowing each agent’s valuation vi to slightly depend on one’s own common-value component
ci, Example 3 can easily satisfy Assumption 0.
It is worth noting that the modified mechanism in Proposition 1 also works in the current
version of Example 3, even though Assumption 0 is violated. To see this, fixed arbitrary di and
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ci ∈ {13 ,
2
3
}, di = (d(1)i , d
(2)




i ) are mutual-
ly independent and uniformly distributed. Given cj =
2
3
, agent i’s valuations for





and 1, respectively; and the corresponding




and 1. While given cj =
1
3
, agent i’s valuations for





and 1, respectively; and the correspond-




and 1. Immediately, the monotonicity condition
on virtual values (condition-(i) of Lemma 3) is satisfied, and that di = (0, 0)
is the worst private-value component for both agents (condition-(ii-c) of Lem-
ma 3). Moreover, fixed any ci, let θ̄i = (ci, (1, 1)), θi = (ci, (0, 1)), θ
′




, (0, 0)) and θ′j = (
2
3
, (0, 0)), and we have γi(θ̄i, θj) > γi(θi, θj) > 0 >
γi(θ
′






j) > 0 > γi(θi, θ
′
j) (condition-(ii-a,b,b’) of Lemma 3).



















i, θj) = 0. Thus, revenue from agent i is improvable with
respect to (θ̄i, θj, θ
′
j), and hence there is no strong foundation.
4.3 No foundations
Next, we study if EPIC mechanisms have the (not necessarily strong) founda-
tion. The following example suggests that the same mechanism as above does not
generally work, if the agents have non-full-support first-order beliefs.
Example 4. In the new mechanism proposed in Example 1, if we allow for non-
full-support beliefs, there exists a situation where agent 1 always correctly predicts
agent 2’s payoff types. Formally, let C = {t ∈ T ∗|θ̂∗(t) = (1, 1), π̂∗11 (t1)[1] = 1},
any ci 6= c′i, we have vi(qi, θi, θ−i) = vi(qi, θ′i, θ−i) for all qi and all θ−i where θi = (ci, di) and
θ′i = (c
′
i, di). Due to incentive compatibility constraints, we only need to set the allocations (as
well as the payments) for agent i at (θi, θ−i) and (θ
′
i, θ−i) to be the same.
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C ′ = {t ∈ T ∗|θ̂∗(t) = (1, 2), π̂∗11 (t1)[2] = 1}, and consider µ such that µ(C) =
f(1, 1) and µ(C ′) = f(1, 2). Because the optimal choice for agent 1 is τ ∗ = 0 (or
reporting y = 1 as his belief for θ2 = 1) if t ∈ C, and τ ∗ = π2 (or reporting y = 0)
if t ∈ C ′, the equilibrium payments in the new mechanism coincide with those in
the optimal EPIC mechanism. Thus, without the full-support belief assumption,
the new mechanism in Example 1 only weakly improves the expected revenue.
Now we further modify the mechanism as follows. Unless agent 1 reports
θ1 = 1 and y = 0, the allocation is the same as the previous mechanism proposed
in Example 1. If agent 1 reports θ1 = 1 and y = 0, then the following events
happen: agent 1 does not buy the good for any θ2, he pays M(> 3) if θ2 = 1 (i.e.,
when his belief turns out to be “wrong”), and the principal offers price 3 for agent
2 (so that agent 2 buys only if θ2 = 2, i.e., when agent 1’s belief turns out to be
“right”), instead of price 2. As before, the new mechanism is Bayesian incentive
compatible on the universal type space T ∗.18
This new mechanism achieves a weakly higher expected revenue than in the
optimal EPIC mechanism. First, this weak improvement is obvious unless θ1 = 1
and y = 0. If θ1 = 1 and y = 0, the principal earns M > 3 from agent 1 if
θ2 = 1 (while the optimal EPIC mechanism yields total revenue 3), and earns 3
from agent 2 if θ2 = 2 (while the optimal EPIC mechanism yields total revenue 2).
To show a strict improvement in expected revenue for any µ ∈ M, consider
the case where θ1 = 1 and θ2 = 2. Because f(1, 2) > 0, it suffices to show that, for
18For agent 1, the only change is that his payment increases when agent 1 reports θ1 = 1 and
y = 0, and agent 2 reports θ2 = 1. Thus, any other type of agent 1 won’t pretend to have θ1 = 1
and y = 0; meanwhile, this change has no effect on agent 1 with θ1 = 1 and y = 0, since he
deems the probability of having θ2 = 1 to be zero. As for agent 2, he is always offered a posted-
price mechanism (depending on agent 1’s report only), then his Bayesian incentive compatible
constraints are satisfied.
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any y ∈ [0, 1] reported by agent 1, the new mechanism achieves a strictly higher
revenue than 2, the revenue in the optimal EPIC mechanism. First, as we see
above, if y = 0 is reported, then the new mechanism yields 3 (from agent 2), and
hence there is a strict improvement. If y > 0, then agent 2 pays 2, and agent 1
pays 1− sin(arc tan 1−y
y
) > 0, and hence, there is again a strict improvement.
Notice that the key for strict improvement is to use agent 1’s belief to modify
the price for agent 2. If agent 1 is correct, such modification is profitable for the
principal. Otherwise, the principal collects a “fine” from agent 1, which is also
profitable.
As suggested in the example, if an agent always correctly predicts the other
agents’ payoff types, we can use this agent’s prediction to raise additional revenue
from the other agents (and to fine him if his prediction turns out to be wrong in
order for the principal to “hedge”, as in the example above). Because this means
that we need to be able to change an agent’s allocation without changing the
others’ – more precisely, we reduce the allocation at the threshold payoff type in
order to charge higher prices for non-threshold winning types – we assume that
the feasible allocation set Q is a lower set, that is, if q is in Q and q′ ≤ q, then q′ is
also in Q. Obviously, the standard auction belongs to this class of environments.
In addition, even if an agent correctly predicts the occurrence of some θ−i (or
its non-occurrence), such information does not necessarily make the principal earn
strictly more revenue from the other agents (for example, imagine that any j(6= i)’s
virtual valuation is negative given θ−i). Thus, we need a stronger version of the
improvability.
Definition 5. We have the strong improvability if there exist i, j, θi, θj, qj, θ−ij
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such that θj ∈ Θ∗j(qj, θi, θ−ij), and that revenue from i is improvable with respect
to
(
θi, (θj, θ−ij), (θ
∗
j (qj, θi, θ−ij), θ−ij)
)
.
Roughly, the strong improvability implies that, if agent i with θi correctly
predicts that −i’s payoff types are not θ′−i, then (given θ−ij) the principal can
know that j’s type is not a threshold type for some qj. Such information enables
the principal to earn higher expected revenue from j.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 0, if Q is a lower set, then strong improvability
implies no foundation of EPIC mechanisms.
The formal proof is given in Appendix C, which directly follows from the idea
of Example 4. The main difference from Proposition 1 is that, when the agent does
not have a full-support first-order belief, the principal extracts more surplus from
other agents by modifying their allocations. This imposes a stronger requirement
on the feasible allocation, so that makes Proposition 2 not applicable to some envi-
ronments. For example, in the single-object auction, strong improvability requires
that agent j is assigned the object at both (θi, θj, θ−ij) and (θi, θ
∗
j (1, θ−j), θ−ij),
which means agent i cannot get the good at either payoff type profile, contra-
dicting the fact that strong improvability also means that agent i should win the
object under at least one payoff type profile.
However, other environments such as a multiple-unit auction where each a-
gent has a unit demand would satisfy the strong improvability. In the previous
auction with common-value and private-value components, we assume that there
are two objects and more than two agents. To get strong improvability, first




j, c−ij) satisfying γi(di, c−i) ≤ 0 < γi(d′i, c−i),
γi(di, c
′
−i) > 0 ≥ γi(d′i, c′−i); then let any agent k 6= i, j have some worst private-
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value component, dk, which induces negative virtual value, so that he will not
get the object in the optimal EPIC mechanism; finally choose ci, dj and d
′
j such
that the smaller one of {γj(dj, ci, c−ij), γj(d′j, ci, c−ij)} is just above 0, and thus
becomes the threshold payoff type under (ci, c−ij). Through a similar argument
with Lemma 3, we can show that revenue from i is improvable with respect to
(ci, d̃i),
(








, where d̃i depends on which
of the three cases in Definition 4 (Improvability) we actually have.
5 Necessary and sufficient condition
A natural question is, under which additional conditions, the ordinal interdepen-
dence implies the strong improvability, so that EPIC mechanisms do not have the
foundation if and only if we do not have the ordinal interdependence. A sufficient
condition is the following richness condition on Q.
Assumption 4. For each i, θi, and θ−i, we have q
EP
i (θi, θ−i) > 0, and for each
θ′i 6= θi, we have qEPi (θi, θ−i) 6= qEPi (θ′i, θ−i).
A representative example is a monopoly problem with multiple buyers and
multiple units of trading.19 Assume that each agent i’s payoff is given by
vi(θi, θ−i, qi, pi) = ui(θi, θ−i)qi − q2i − pi,
where qi(≥ 0) is the quantity assigned to agent i, and pi is agent i’s payment to
the principal. Assume that there is no feasibility constraint on q. The principal
19 See Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Segal (2003) (or their straightforward generalizations) for
such environments, although they focus on private-value environments.
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maximizes the expected revenue. We can see that an agent’s valuation is concave








s.t. ∀i, θi, θ′i, θ−i : qi(θ) ≥ 0;





i, θ−i)− q2i (θ′i, θ−i)− pi(θ′i, θ−i)
}
.











s.t. ∀i, θi, θ−i, θ′i ≺
θ−i
i θi : qi(θ) ≥ 0; qi(θi, θ−i) ≥ qi(θ′i, θ−i).
The virtual value γi is given by:
γi(θi, θ−i) := ui(θi, θ−i)−
1− Fi(θi | θ−i)
f(θi | θ−i)
(









If we assume (i) for all i and θ, we have γi(θ) > 0, and (ii) γi(θ
′
i, θ−i) < γi(θi, θ−i)
whenever θ′i ≺
θ−i







Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 0, 1 and 4, if Q is a lower set, then EPIC mech-
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anisms have the foundation if and only if we do not have ordinal interdependence.
Remark 4. In some contexts, the assumption that each agent is always assigned
a positive quantity may be considered as a restrictive assumption. However, we
adopt this assumption because it is relatively transparent, and it simplifies the
proof of the theorem. Weaker conditions may suffice at the cost of less transparent
statement and more complicated argument.
More specifically, imagine an environment where, given some θ−i, agent i is







i, θ−i) > 0, we have q
EP
i (θi, θ−i) 6= qEPi (θ′i, θ−i). Assume that there exists
a subset of payoff types, Θ̃i for each i, such that those types are always assigned
some non-zero quantities. Then, one can show that EPIC mechanisms do not have
the foundation if ordinal interdependence occurs for those always-positive-quantity
type profiles.
6 “Unimprovable” mechanisms?
Given our result that EPIC mechanisms could be improved when the environ-
ment exhibits significant interdependence, it seems natural to ask: Then, which
mechanism(s) is (are) “unimprovable”, that is, a mechanism for which no other
mechanism can achieve a higher expected revenue regardless of the principal’s
belief µ (strictly at least for some µ)?
To simplify the analysis, we consider a “reduced form” of the multi-agent en-
vironment, where we focus on a particular agent with privately-known payoff type
θ, and the other agents’ payoff type profile θ−i is represented by a state variable
ω ∈ Ω which becomes publicly known after the agent’s report. Thus, the agent’s
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type is a pair (θ, β), where θ is his payoff-type and β ∈ ∆(Ω) represents his belief
about ω. Let T = Θ×∆(Ω) denote the agent’s type space.
We assume that the allocation is denoted by (q, p) ∈ [0, 1] × R, where q rep-
resents the probability of selling a single good, and p represents the monetary
transfer from the agent to the principal. The principal’s payoff is the revenue, p,
and the agent’s payoff given (q, p) is denoted by v(ω, θ)q − p. It is without loss
of generality to focus on the class of direct mechanisms Γ = (M, q, p) where the
agent participates in the mechanism and reports (θ, β) truthfully.
The following example suggests that we need to make a further restriction on
the principal’s belief µ; otherwise would not be a well-defined question to find
unimprovable mechanisms.
Example 5. Let Ω = {0, 1} and Θ = {1}, and the agent’s valuation is v(ω, θ) =
θ(= 1). That is, ω does not change his value, and in this sense, it is a private-value
environment. Furthermore, the agent has no payoff-relevant private information.
The optimal EPIC mechanism fully extract the valuation: qEP (ω, θ) = pEP (ω, θ) =
θ(= 1).
This mechanism may seem to be “obviously optimal”. However, it is (unbound-
edly) improvable by the following mechanism Γ = (T, q, p): q(ω, θ, β) = 1 for all
ω, θ, β; p(ω, θ, β) = 1 if β(ω) > 0; and p(ω, θ, β) = P (> 0) if β(ω) = 0. It is obvi-
ous that truth-telling of θ(= 1) and β is optimal for the agent, which implies that,
for any µ, the revenue is at least 1. Moreover, for µ with µ({ω, θ, β|β(ω) = 0}) > 0
(i.e., the principal believes that, with a positive probability, the agent is “complete-
ly wrong”), the principal’s expected revenue is strictly greater than 1.
Actually, P can be any number greater than 1, and increasing P always implies
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further improvement, and hence, no “unimprovable” mechanism exists.
The above example suggests that the question of unimprovable mechanism can
only make sense by (further) restricting our attention on the class of µ which does
not assign a positive probability that the agent is “completely wrong”.
Formally, we say that µ is strongly admissible if it is in M and it does not
assign a positive probability for the agent being completely wrong:
µ({ω, θ, β|β(ω) = 0}) = 0, ∀ω, θ.
Then, based on Börgers (2017), we say that a (direct) mechanism Γ = (T, q, p) is
dominated (instead of “improved”) by another (direct) mechanism Γ′ = (T, q, p′) if
(i) for any strongly admissible µ, the expected revenue in Γ′ is weakly higher than
that in Γ, and (ii) there exists a strongly admissible µ with which the expected
revenue in Γ′ is strictly higher. A mechanism is undominated (or “unimprovable”)
if it is not dominated.20 Applying this definition, the optimal EPIC mechanism
where the agent always pays 1 is undominated in Example 5.
Characterizing undominated mechanisms in the general environment is an in-
teresting question but beyond the scope of the paper, so left for future research.
Nevertheless, we believe that our idea of mechanism construction in the previous
sections could be useful for this ambitious question. In order to illustrate this
point, in what follows, we characterize all the mechanisms that (i) dominate the
optimal EPIC mechanism and (ii) are undominated, in the context of Example 2.
20Börgers (2017) shows that the dominant-strategy mechanism of Chung and Ely (2007) is
dominated in private-value environments with three or more agents. Characterizing the class of
undominated mechanisms seems an open question.
35
6.1 Example 2 revisited
We consider the following class of mechanisms Γ = (T, q, p): q(·) = qEP (·);
p(ω, θ, β) = pEP (ω, θ) if θ ∈ {0, 1}; and,
(






if β(1) = y ∈ [0, 1].
It is a class of mechanisms in the sense that (a(y), b(y))y∈[0,1] are the free pa-
rameters. We denote this class by Γ∗. In particular, the non-EPIC mechanism
constructed in Example 2 (that dominates the optimal EPIC mechanism) is in this
class.
Let ΓU denote the set of all mechanisms that are undominated and that dom-
inate the optimal EPIC mechanism.
Proposition 3. Γ is in ΓU if and only if it is in Γ∗ with (a(y), b(y))y∈[0,1] satisfying
(i) (a(y), b(y))y∈[0,1] (as a set of points on R2) lies on a continuous, convex, non-
increasing curve that connects (2, 3) and (3, 2); and (ii) either limy↑1 a(y) = 3 or
limy↓0 b(y) = 3 holds (or both).
In particular, the result says that the non-EPIC mechanism constructed in
Example 2 (that dominates the optimal EPIC mechanism) is undominated. That
is, if any other mechanism achieve a strictly higher expected revenue for some
(strongly admissible) µ than that non-EPIC mechanism, such a mechanism nec-
essarily achieves a strictly lower revenue for another (strongly admissible) µ. In
this sense, that non-EPIC mechanism cannot be further improved.
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7 Conclusion
If the environment exhibits only cardinal interdependence (and certain regulari-
ty conditions), then there exist the maxmin and Bayesian foundations for EPIC
mechanisms, in the sense of Chung and Ely (2007). If the environment exhibits or-
dinal interdependence, (and certain additional conditions), then such a foundation
may not exist.
In interdependent-value environments, Yamashita (2015) provides an alterna-
tive solution concept (that is, incentive compatibility in value revelation), which is
also robust to the agents’ belief structure in a related sense and useful in the im-
plementation of social choice correspondences in undominated strategies. It may
be interesting to investigate similar sorts of foundation results for this alternative
solution concept.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Because θ−ii =
θ′−i
i for all i, θ−i, and θ
′
−i, we denote this ordering by i with no
superscript. Also, let Θi = {θ1i , . . . , θNi } (where N = |Θi|) so that θni ≺i θn+1i for
all n = 1, . . . , N − 1.
Consider the simple type space T̂ f = (Ti, θ̂i, π̂i)Ii=1 with Ti = Θi and the













i , θ−i) for all




i , θ−i). By convention, Gi(θ
N+1
i , θ−i) = 0.
The optimal Bayesian mechanism given this simple type space achieves:
















i , θ−i), θ
n
i , θ−i)− pi(θni , θ−i)
)









i , θ−i), θ
n













i , θ−i)− pi(θli, θ−i)
)
. (BICn→li )
Because the identity function θ̂i is one-to-one, by Lemma 1, T̂ f can be embed-
ded in the universal type space T ∗ through a bijection h such that tni = hi(θni ).
Thus, V (f) provides an upper bound for the best expected revenue given the uni-
versal type space T ∗ (and the principal’s belief µ∗ ∈M such that µ∗(h(θ̂−1(θ))) =
f(θ)). Therefore, in order to show the Bayesian foundation for EPIC mechanisms
given f , it suffices to show that V (f) ≤ REPf .
We first prove the claim by imposing the non-singularity condition on f , which
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assumes that Ωi = (f(θ
1
i , ·), . . . , f(θNi , ·))ᵀ has rank N for each i, where f(θni , ·) =
(f(θ1i , θ−i))θ−i∈Θ−i is a (I − 1)N -dimensional vector.
Lemma 4. In the solution of V (f), (BICn→n−1i ) holds with equality for all i and
n 6= 1, and (BIRni ) holds with equality for all i and n.
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i , θ−i), θ
n
i , θ−i)−Gi(θn+1i , θ−i)vi(qi(θ
n










Therefore, under Assumption 1, we have V (f) = REPf .
Proof of Lemma 4. We first show that each upward incentive constraint, (BICn→li )









the matrix of agent i’s beliefs, where each π̂i(θ
n


























, and hence Πi has a rank N . Thus, there
exists λ ∈ R(I−1)N such that:
Πiλ = (1, . . . , 1, 0︸︷︷︸
l-th element
, . . . , 0)ᵀ.
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If we add λ to pi(θ
l
i, ·), each BICn→li with n < l is relaxed, while no other
(BIC) and (BIR) constraints are affected. Moreover, from π̂i(θ
l
i) · λ = 0 and
π̂i(θ
l+1















i, θ−i)λ(θ−i) = 0, that is, the principal’s expected
revenue is also unaffected.
Next, we show that for any mechanism (q, p) satisfying the remaining con-
straints, there exists a mechanism (q′, p′) which satisfies not only the remaining
constraints, but also (BIRni ) for n = 1, . . . , N and (BIC
n→n−1
i ) for n = 2, . . . , N
with equality, and raises at least as high expected revenue as (q, p).
Given any such mechanism (q, p), if (BICn→n−1i ) is satisfied with strict in-
equality for some i and n, then let βn→n−1i be the amount of the slackness of this
constraint (BICn→n−1i ). Let Π
′
i be the matrix generated by substituting the n-th
row of Πi with the vector f(θ
n−1, ·). That is:
Π′i =









0 · · · κn−1i 0 0 · · · 0
0 · · · 0 1 0 · · · 0








0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · κNi










0 · · · 1 1 1 · · · 1
0 · · · 1 0 0 · · · 0












and hence, Π′i has a rank N . Thus, there exists λ ∈ R(I−1)N such that:
Π′iλ = (0, . . . , 0, 1︸︷︷︸
n-th element
, 0, . . . , 0)ᵀ.
Because π̂i(θ
n−1
i ) · λ = 0 and f(θn−1, ·) · λ = 1, we have:
π̂i(θ
n





i ) · λ− κni f(θn−1, ·) · λ < 0,
and thus, ε = −βn→n−1i /(π̂i(θni ) · λ) > 0. If we add ελ to pi(θn−1i , ·), then all
the constraints for types θli with l 6= n are unaffected because π̂i(θli) · λ = 0 for
all l 6= n, and for type θni only constraint (BICn→n−1i ) is changed, which holds
with equality under the new payment rule. Because f(θn−1, ·) · (ελ) = ε > 0, the
expected revenue increases under the new payment rule.
Similarly, if (BIRni ) is satisfied with strict inequality for some i and n, then
let βni be the amount of the slackness of this constraint (BIR
n
i ). Because Πi has
a rank N , there exists λ ∈ R(I−1)N such that:
Πiλ = (β
1




Adding λ to each pi(θ
n
i , ·) does not affect any (BIC) constraint, while all the
participation constraints are satisfied with equality in the new mechanism. The
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Next, we consider the case where f is singular, that is, for some i, Ωi has a rank
strictly less than N . Consider a sequence of distributions over Θ, {fr}∞r=1, such
that each fr is full-support and fr → f (in the standard Euclidean distance).21
By Assumption 1, without loss of generality, we assume that the monotonicity
constraints (M) are not binding in the problem of REPfr .
We prove the following continuity lemma.
Lemma 5. For each ε > 0, there exists rε ∈ N such that, for any r ≥ rε,
REPfr ≤ R
EP
f + ε and V (fr) ≥ V (f)− ε.













which is obviously continuous in f .
For the second inequality, let (q, p) be a solution to the problem of V (f).
21 We can always find such a sequence because the set of all non-singular distributions is a
dense subset of the set of all distributions over Θ.
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In the following, for each r, we construct another mechanism (q, pr) (note that
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i , θ−i)− vi(qi(θni , θ−i), θni , θ−i)
) ,
denote the size of violation of (BIRni (r)) by p. If we consider a modified payment
rule p′ so that p′i(θ
n
i , ·) = pi(θni , ·) − Sni (r)1, then this new payment rule satis-
fies the participation constraints, but may not satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraints. Thus, let:
























i , θ−i), θ
n
i , θ−i)− p′i(θni , θ−i)
)}
,
denote the size of violation of (BICn→li (r)) by p
′. As in the first part of the proof,












has a rank N , and hence, there exists λ1i (r), . . . , λ
N
i (r) ∈ R(I−1)N such that:
Πri
(









which we denote by Lr. Or equivalently:
Lr =



























i , ·) = pi(θni , ·)− Sni (r)1 + λni (r). Then, together with q, it satisfies
all the constraints of the problem of V (fr).






i (θ) − pi(θ))fr(θ) → 0 as
















as r →∞, because Lr → 0.
Finally, contrarily to the original claim, suppose that V (f) > REPf , and let




). Then, there exists rε such that:
V (fr)−REPfr ≥ V (f)−R
EP
f − 2ε > 0,
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which contradicts the first part of this proof.
B Proof of Proposition 1
We show that, for each of these cases, there exists a mechanism that yields a
strictly higher expected revenue than the optimal EPIC mechanism.
Case (i): θ∗i (qi, θ−i) /∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i), θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) /∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i), θi ∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) ∩
Θ∗i (qi, θ−i).
Consider a new mechanism (M, q∗, p∗) such that Mi = Θi× [0, 1], Mj = Θj for
j 6= i, and for each ((θ̃i, x), θ̃−i) ∈M ,
q∗((θ̃i, x), θ̃−i) = q
EP (θ̃),
p∗j((θ̃i, x), θ̃−i) = p
EP
j (θ̃), ∀j 6= i,
and for p∗i , we set p
∗
i ((θ̃i, x), θ̃−i) = p
EP
i (θ̃) unless θ̃i ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) ∩Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) and
θ̃−i ∈ {θ−i, θ′−i}; and for each θ̃i ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) ∩Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i), we set
p∗i ((θ̃i, x), θ−i) = p
EP
i (θ̃i, θ−i) + η(1− x),







where ψ(x) = 1−
√
1− x2.
Intuitively, x ∈ [0, 1] is related to agent i’s first-order belief over θ−i and θ′−i
(more precisely, their likelihood ratio). Indeed, if agent i reports his payoff type





, where β is
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i’s first-order belief for θ−i and β
′ is i’s first-order belief for θ′−i. Note that, given
any µ ∈Mfull, agent i chooses x ∈ (0, 1) with probability one.
It is then obvious that, if the agents report their payoff types truthfully (and
agent i chooses x optimally), then this new mechanism yields a strictly higher
expected revenue than the optimal EPIC mechanism.
For any agent j 6= i, the new mechanism is outcome-equivalent to the optimal
EPIC mechanism, and hence satisfies EPIC and EPIR.
We show the incentive compatibility of agent i with θ̃i ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i)∩Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i)
(for the other payoff types, the new mechanism is outcome-equivalent to the opti-
mal EPIC mechanism, and hence satisfies EPIC and EPIR). First, obviously, any
deviation to θ̂i ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) ∩ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) is not profitable. Second, any deviation
to θ̂i ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) \Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) is not profitable either, because, letting β and β′ be
his first-order beliefs for θ−i and θ
′
−i respectively, the expected gain by deviation
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is at most22
β[η(1− x∗(β, β′))] + β′[−η + ηψ(x∗(β, β′))] ≤ 0.
As shown in Footnote 22, the key step is to prove that in the optimal EPIC
mechanism, certain deviations would lead to a payoff loss of at least η for the
agent. This is where the −η term in the second bracket comes from.
Similarly, we can show that any deviation to θ̂i ∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) \ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) and
θ̂i /∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) ∪Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) is not profitable either.
Case (ii): θi ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) \Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) and θ∗i (qi, θ−i) ∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i).
Consider a new mechanism (M, q∗, p∗) such that Mi = Θi× [0, 1], Mj = Θj for







































η · ψ(x∗(β, β′))
]









−i)− pEPi (θ̃i, θ′−i)− vi(qEPi (θ̂i, θ′−i), θ̃i, θ′−i) + pEPi (θ̂i, θ′−i)
]
.
Without loss of generality, we assume that q′i ∈ Q
+

























. Because qEPi (θ̃i, θ
′
















−i)− pEPi (θ̃i, θ′−i)− vi(qEPi (θ̂i, θ′−i), θ̃i, θ′−i) + pEPi (θ̂i, θ′−i)





−i)− vi(q′i, θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i), θ′−i)− vi(qEPi (θ̂i, θ′−i), θ̃i, θ′−i) + vi(qEPi (θ̂i, θ′−i), θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i), θ′−i)
≥0 + η.
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j 6= i, and for each ((θ̃i, x), θ̃−i) ∈M ,
q∗((θ̃i, x), θ̃−i) = q
EP (θ̃),
p∗j((θ̃i, x), θ̃−i) = p
EP
j (θ̃), ∀j 6= i,
and for p∗i , we set p
∗
i ((θ̃i, x), θ̃−i) = p
EP
i (θ̃) unless θ̃i ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) \ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) and
θ̃−i ∈ {θ−i, θ′−i}; and for each θ̃i ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) \Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i), we set
p∗i ((θ̃i, x), θ−i) = p
EP
i (θ̃i, θ−i) + η(1− x),







where ψ(x) = 1−
√
1− x2.
Again, x ∈ [0, 1] is related to agent i’s first-order belief over θ−i and θ′−i. Indeed,





, where β is i’s first-order belief for θ−i and β
′ is i’s first-
order belief for θ′−i. Note that, given any µ ∈Mfull, agent i chooses x ∈ (0, 1) with
probability one.
It is obvious that, if the agents report their payoff types truthfully (and agent
i chooses x optimally), then this new mechanism yields a strictly higher expected
revenue than the optimal EPIC mechanism.
For any agent j 6= i, the new mechanism is outcome-equivalent to the optimal
EPIC mechanism, and hence satisfies EPIC and EPIR.
We show the incentive compatibility of agent i with θ̃i ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i)\Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i)
(for the other payoff types, the new mechanism is outcome-equivalent to the opti-
mal EPIC mechanism, and hence satisfies EPIC and EPIR). First, obviously, any
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deviation to θ̂i ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) \ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) is not profitable. Second, any deviation
to θ̂i ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i)∩Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) is not profitable either, because, letting β and β′ be
his first-order beliefs for θ−i and θ
′
−i respectively, the expected gain by deviation
is at most
β[η(1− x∗(β, β′))] + β′[−η + ηψ(x∗(β, β′))] ≤ 0.
Similarly, we can show that any deviation to θ̂i ∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) \ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) and
θ̂i /∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) ∪Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) is not profitable either.
Case (iii) is symmetry to case (ii), thus we omit its proof. In conclusion, EPIC
mechanisms do not have the strong foundation.
C Proof of Proposition 2
Assume that (i, θi, θj, qj, θ̃−ij) satisfies the definition of strong improvability. We
use the same mechanism as in Proposition 1, except that the allocations for agent
i and j change in case agent i reports θi and x = 1. Recall that, given his





are his first-order beliefs for θ−i, θ
′
−i, respectively, with θ−i = (θj, θ̃−ij) and θ
′
−i =
(θ∗j (qj, θi, θ̃−ij), θ̃−ij); x = 1 means that he predicts that j does not have a threshold
type for qj given (θi, θ̃−ij). The allocations from agents i and j are then modified
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as follows (and all the other parts of the mechanism are the same as before):
q∗∗j ((θi, 1), θ
∗
j (qj, θi, θ̃−ij), θ̃−ij) = q
∗
j ((θi, 1), θ̂j, θ̃−ij),
p∗∗j ((θi, 1), θ
∗
j (qj, θi, θ̃−ij), θ̃−ij) = p
∗
j((θi, 1), θ̂j, θ̃−ij),
p∗∗j ((θi, 1), θj, θ̃−ij) = p
∗




j (qj, θi, θ̃−ij)
p∗∗i ((θi, 1), θ
∗
j (qj, θi, θ̃−ij), θ̃−ij) = M,
where θ̂j is j’s payoff type that is just below θ
∗
j (qj, θi, θ̃−ij) with respect to ≺
θi,θ̃−ij
j ,
and M > 0 is sufficiently large.
Observe that the modified mechanism satisfies all the constraints. First, except
for agents i and j, the allocations are the same as in the previous mechanism. For
agent i, large fine M is irrelevant unless he assigns zero probability for θ′−i (because
x = 1 is not optimal for him); on the other hand, if he assigns zero probability for
θ′−i, then this large fine is also payoff-irrelevant for him. Finally, for agent j, we
only need to check his incentive if i reports (θi, 1) and −ij report θ̃ij: in such a




j (qj, θi, θ̃−ij) has no incentive of misreporting,
because their on-path payoffs would be the same as in the original mechanism,









j ((θi, 1), θ̂j, θ̃−ij), θi, θ̃j, θ̃−ij)− p∗j((θi, 1), θ̂j, θ̃−ij)
≤ vj(q∗j ((θi, 1), θ̃j, θ̃−ij), θi, θ̃j, θ̃−ij)− p∗j((θi, 1), θ̃j, θ̃−ij)− η,




j (qj , θi, θ̃−ij) for




j (qj , θi, θ̃−ij) would lead to a payoff loss of at least η. Moreover, he




j (qj , θi, θ̃−ij), because the increase in payment for




j (qj , θi, θ̃−ij)} is uniform.
51
but the right-hand side is precisely his on-path payoff. The individual rationality
constraints can be checked similarly.
Finally, we show that this modified mechanism achieves a strictly higher ex-
pected revenue than the original mechanism. First, observe that it does not yield
a lower payoff given any payoff-type profile. It is obvious except when the payoff-
type profile is (θi, θ
∗
j (qj, θi, θ̃−ij), θ̃−ij) and agent i chooses x = 1; if this is the
realized payoff-type profile, and agent i reports x = 1, agent i pays a large fine M .
Therefore, the principal would be better off by setting M large enough.




j (qj, θi, θ̃−ij).
Due to the full-support assumption on the principal’s prior belief for θ, (θi, θ̃j, θ̃−ij)
occurs with strictly positive probability; that is, the µ-measure of subset {t ∈
T ∗ | θ̂∗(t) = (θi, θ̃j, θ̃−ij)} is strictly positive. If agent i chooses x < 1 (at least
with a positive probability), then i pays η(1 − x)(> 0) more than in the original
mechanism, and hence, strict improvement is achieved. If agent i chooses x = 1
(with probability one), then the principal increases j’s payment by η as explained
above, and thus, again strict improvement is achieved.
D Proof of Theorem 3
It suffices to show that ordinal interdependence implies strong improvability.
By ordinal interdependence, there exist i, θ−i, θ
′





first observe the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Ordinal interdependence implies that there exist j 6= i, θj, θ′j, and θ̃−ij




Proof of Lemma 6. Let i = 1 without loss of generality, and for each n = 1, . . . , I,






j=n+1). Note that θ
1





























By the lemma, there exists θi, θ
′





















j, θ̃−ij), by Assumption 4, we






j, θ̃−ij) = θ
∗





j, θ̃−ij) and θ
∗
i (qi, θj, θ̃−ij) ∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′j, θ̃−ij). Then, revenue from agent i is
improvable with respect to
(











j, θi, θ̃−ij). By Assumption 4, we have
θ′j = θ
∗
j (qj, θi, θ̃−ij) and θj ∈ Θ∗j(qj, θi, θ̃−ij)\{θ∗j (qj, θi, θ̃−ij)}. Thus, revenue from i
is improvable with respect to
(
θi, (θj, θ̃−ij), (θ
∗
j (qj, θi, θ̃−ij), θ̃−ij)
)
, which establishes
the strong improvability. If θ′j 
θi,θ̃−ij
j θj, let qj = q
EP
j (θj, θi, θ̃−ij), then by a
symmetry argument we have strong improvability.
E Proof of Proposition 3
The proof comprises several lemmas.
Lemma 7. If Γ = (T, q, p) dominates the optimal EPIC mechanism, then p(ω, θ, β) ≥
pEP (ω, θ) for all (ω, θ, β).
Proof. First, we allow for µ that does not satisfy our strong admissibility (in the
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way described below), and prove the statement. Then, we provide a continuity ar-
gument showing that, even with strong admissibility, the statement goes through.
Let βω be the degenerate belief which puts probability 1 on having ω. Define
µEP such that µEP
(
{ω} × {θ} × {βω}
)
= f(ω, θ) for all ω, θ.
Because the agent knows the realization of ω when reporting to the princi-
pal, the optimal BIC mechanism for µEP is the optimal EPIC mechanism. Since
RµEP (Γ) ≥ REPf , we have (q, p)(ω, θ, βω) = (qEP , pEP )(ω, θ) for all ω, θ.
Suppose that there exists some ω̃, θ̃, β̃ such that p(ω̃, θ̃, β̃) < pEP (ω̃, θ̃). Con-
sider a joint belief µ̂ satisfying:
(i) µ̂
(
{ω} × {θ} × {βω}
)
= f(ω, θ) for all (ω, θ) 6= (ω̃, θ̃);
(ii) µ̂
(
{ω̃} × {θ̃} × {β̃}
)
= f(ω̃, θ̃).
This µ̂ does not satisfy our strong admissibility, and we take care of this point at
the end of the proof.








f(ω, θ)pEP (ω, θ) + f(ω̃, θ̃)pEP (ω̃, θ̃)
= REPf .
Now, recall that the above µ̂ does not satisfy our strong admissibility. However,
it is easy to construct a sequence {µk}k∈N, where each µk is strongly admissible
and converges to µ̂ (in a weak-* topology), and along the sequence the expected
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revenue also converges. Therefore, it contradicts that Γ dominates the optimal
EPIC mechanism.
This lemma implies that, if Γ is in ΓU , then it must be in Γ∗. The next
lemma shows that, based on a similar logic, if a mechanism that dominates the
optimal EPIC mechanism is further dominated by an alternative mechanism, this
alternative mechanism must have a pointwise (weakly-)higher payment than that
mechanism.
Lemma 8. Mechanism Γ = (T, q, p) that dominates the optimal EPIC mechanism
is dominated by Γ̂ = (T, q̂, p̂) if and only if p(ω, θ, β) ≥ p̂(ω, θ, β) for all (ω, θ, β).
Next, we obtain further properties of Γ if it is in ΓU .
Lemma 9. If Γ is in ΓU , then it is in Γ∗ with (a(y), b(y))y∈[0,1] satisfying (i)
(a(y), b(y))y∈[0,1] (as a set of points on R2) lies on a continuous, convex, non-
increasing curve that connects (2, 3) and (3, 2); and (ii) either limy↑1 a(y) = 3 or
limy↓0 b(y) = 3 holds (or both).
Proof. We first show (i). By Lemma 7 and the IR constraints, we obtain:
(
q(ω, θ, β), p(ω, θ, β)
)
= (qEP (ω, θ), pEP (ω, θ)),
for (ω, θ) = (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) and any β ∈ ∆(Ω); and
q(0, 2, β) = q(1, 2, β) = 1, p(0, 2, β) ≥ 2, p(1, 2, β) ≥ 2,
for any β ∈ ∆(Ω). Recall our notation: a(y) = p(0, 2, β), and b(y) = p(1, 2, β) for
y = β(1).
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Due to the IC constraint that type (θ = 2, y = 0) won’t pretend to be (θ =
0, y = 0), we have a(0) = 2; similarly we have b(1) = 2. For any y ∈ (0, 1), we
must have a(y) ≤ 3; otherwise reporting θ = 1 is a profitable deviation. Similarly
we have b(y) ≤ 3 for any y ∈ (0, 1). Notice that
(1− y)(3− a(y)) + y(3− b(y)) ≥ max{1− y, y}
for all y ∈ (0, 1). Thus, given any ε > 0, we have
a(y)− 2 ≤ 3− yb(y)− (1− y)
1− y
− 2 ≤ 3− 2y − (1− y)
1− y
− 2 = y
1− y
< ε,
for all y < ε
ε+1
. Therefore, we have limy↓0 a(y) = 2. Similarly, we have limy↑1 b(y) =
2. It follows that a(y) + b(y) ≤ 5 for any y ∈ (0, 1); otherwise either (a(ε), b(ε))
or (a(1− ε), b(1− ε)) would be a profitable deviation for sufficiently small ε(> 0).
On the other hand, by assumption on µ, the value of a(1) (or b(0)) is irrelevant,
as long as type θ = 2 with y 6= 1 (or y 6= 0) won’t pretend to be y = 1 (or y = 0).
Thus, without loss of generality, we choose a(1) = b(0) = 3.
For each y ∈ [0, 1], define
Y (y) =
{
(a, b) ∈ [2, 3]2 | (1− y)a(y) + yb(y) ≤ (1− y)a+ yb
}
,
which is convex and compact, and contains {(a(y), b(y)) | y ∈ [0, 1]}. Define
Y =
⋂
y∈[0,1] Y (y), and then Y is also convex and compact. Let ∂Y be the boundary
of Y which is below the line a+ b = 5, that is,
∂Y =
{




Then, ∂Y is a continuous convex curve connecting the two points (2, 3) and (3, 2).
∂Y is related with (a(y), b(y)) in the following way. On one hand, (a(y), b(y)) ∈
∂Y for all y ∈ [0, 1]; otherwise there exists ε, ε2 > 0 such that (a − ε, b − ε2) ∈
Y ⊆ Y (y), violating the definition of Y (y). On the other hand, for any (a, b) ∈ ∂Y
satisfying (1−y′)a+y′b < (1−y′)a′+y′b′ for some y′ and any other (a′, b′) ∈ ∂Y , we
must have (a, b) = (a(y′), b(y′)). To prove this, suppose that (a, b) 6= (a(y′), b(y′)),
then we have (1−y′)a+y′b < (1−y′)a(y′)+y′b(y′), which means that (a, b) /∈ Y (y′).
It follows that (a, b) /∈ Y , contradicting (a, b) ∈ ∂Y .
Putting a on the horizontal axis and b on the vertical axis, we define the
function b(a):
b(a) =
 limy→0 b(y) if a = 2b′ such that (a, b′) ∈ ∂Y if 2 < a ≤ 3.
Immediately, we have ∂Y = {(a, b) | b = b(a)} ∪ {(2, b) | b(a) < b ≤ 3}. Moreover,
b = b(a) is convex, continuous, and non-increasing (otherwise it would violate
b(y) ≥ 2 for all y).
Now we show (ii). Suppose we have b̄ = limy→0 b(y) < 3 and ā = limy→1 a(y) <
3, then define ȳ such that (1− ȳ)(3− ā) = ȳ(3− b̄). Consider the following payment







a(y), b(y) + 3− b̄
)
if 0 ≤ y ≤ ȳ(
a(y) + 3− ā, b(y)
)
if ȳ < y ≤ 1.
Obviously, θ = 0, 1 won’t pretend to be θ = 2. Also, θ = 2 with y, y′ ∈ [0, ȳ] (or
y, y′ ∈ (ȳ, 1]) won’t pretend to be each other, because the changes in payment are
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the same. Pick y ∈ [0, ȳ] and y′ ∈ (ȳ, 1], since we have
(1− y)ã(y) + yb̃(y) = (1− y)a(y) + y
(
b(y) + 3− b̄
)
= (1− y)a(y) + yb(y) + y(3− b̄)
≤ (1− y)a(y′) + yb(y′) + (1− y)(3− ā)
= (1− y)
(
a(y′) + 3− ā
)
+ yb(y′)
= (1− y)ã(y′) + yb̃(y′),
then the expected payment is lower by telling the truth than misreporting. By
a similar argument, agent with y′ won’t pretend to have y, either. Agent θ = 2
won’t report θ = 1 because
(1− y)(3− ã(y)) + y(3− b̃(y)) ≥ (1− y)(3− ã(1)) + y(3− b̃(1))
= (1− y)
(
3− a(1)− 3 + ā
)
+ y(3− b(1))
= (1− y) · 0 + y(3− p(1, 1)).
Similarly, θ = 2 won’t report θ = 0. Clearly, the new mechanism achieves weakly
higher expected revenue than Γ for any µ, and strictly higher expected revenue
when µ
(
{0} × {2} × {y | ȳ < y < 1}
)
> 0.
Now we show the converse, completing the proof of the proposition.
Lemma 10. Suppose that Γ is in Γ∗ with (a(y), b(y))y∈[0,1] satisfying (i) (a(y), b(y))y∈[0,1]
(as a set of points on R2) lies on a continuous, convex, non-increasing curve that
connects (2, 3) and (3, 2); and (ii) either limy↓1 a(y) = 3 or limy↓0 b(y) = 3 holds
(or both). Then, Γ is in ΓU .
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Proof. Suppose there exists Γ′ that dominates Γ. Assume that the payment rules
for θ = 2 in Γ and Γ′ are (a(y), b(y)) and (a′(y), b′(y)), respectively. First, we show
that the two corresponding curves, denoted by b = b(a) and b′ = b′(a′), have no
interior common point: If they do, then we can find (s, t) with s ∈ (2, 3) such that,
either right derivatives or left derivatives of the two curves at (s, t) are different;
otherwise b = b(a) and b′ = b′(a′) would be the same. Without loss of generality,
assume that the left derivatives, given by










satisfies (−∞ <) k < k′ (< 0). Then, pick y ∈ (k, k′), and we have
a′(y) < s ≤ a(y), b′(y) > t ≥ b(y).
By Lemma 8, Γ and Γ′ cannot dominate each other. Thus, b = b(a) and b′ =
b′(a′) can only have common point in {(s, t) | s = 2 or t = 2}. Without loss of
generality, we assume that limy→0 b(y) = limy→0 b
′(y) = 3. Additionally, we must
have b′(a) > b(a) for all a ∈ (2, 3); otherwise Γ′ cannot dominate Γ.




= 0, we can find a ∈ (0, ā) such





. By Lemma 9, both b = b(a) and b′ = b′(a′) have
derivatives almost everywhere on [a, ā] (as convex functions, they are absolutely
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continuous). Suppose ∂−b(s) ≥ ∂−b′(s) for all s ∈ [a, ā]. Then we have
















≤ b′(a)− b(a) < b′(ā)− b(ā),
which forms a contradiction. Thus, there exists some s ∈ [a, ā] such that ∂−b(s) <
∂−b
′(s). Picking y such that ∂−b(s) < y < ∂−b
′(s), we have
b′(y) > b′(s) > b(s) ≥ b(y), a′(y) < s ≤ a(y).
By Lemma 8, Γ′ cannot dominate Γ.
F Miscellany
F.1 A sufficient condition for Assumption 1
When there is no ordinal interdependence, ≺i does not depend on θ−i for all i.
As in Chung and Ely (2007), we consider the auction environment where Θi =
{θ1i , . . . , θMi } satisfying θmi − θm−1i = γ > 0 for each m, and agent i’s valuation
given payoff type profile θ is vi(θ). The following lemma characterizes a class of
interdependent-value environments satisfying Assumption 1.
Lemma 11. Under the following conditions,
(1) f(θ) is affiliated: for all θ and θ′, we have f(θ ∨ θ′)f(θ ∧ θ′) ≥ f(θ)f(θ′);
(2) f(θ) has increasing hazard rate: f(θi|θ−i)
1−Fi(θi|θ−i) is increasing on θi;
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(4) vi(θ) is supermodular: ∀θ, θ′, we have vi(θ ∨ θ′) + vi(θ ∧ θ′) ≥ vi(θ) + vi(θ′);
(5) ∀θi < θ′i, ∀j 6= i, we have vi(θ′i, θ−i)− vi(θi, θ−i) ≥ vj(θ′i, θ−i)− vj(θi, θ−i),
virtual valuation satisfies the regularity conditions: ∀θ, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . I}, ∀j ∈
{0, 1, . . . I} \ {i}, we have
γi(θ) ≥ γj(θ) =⇒ γi(θ̂i, θ−i) > γj(θ̂i, θ−i), ∀θ̂i > θi,
where γ0(·) ≡ 0, and
γi(θ
m
i , θ−i) := vi(θ
m
i , θ−i)−





i , θ−i)− vi(θmi , θ−i)
)
.
















j, θ−ij)− vi(θi, θ′j, θ−ij) ≥ vi(θ′i, θj, θ−ij)− vi(θi, θj, θ−ij).
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Write θ+i := θi + γ. For any θ̂i > θi, we have
(






















1− Fj(θj | θ̂i, θ−ij)



































vj(θ̂i, θ−i)− vj(θi, θ−i)
)
+
[1− Fi(θi | θ−i)
f(θi | θ−i)

















j , θi, θ−ij)− vj(θj, θi, θ−ij)
)
≥0.
Thus, γi(θ̂i, θ−i)− γj(θ̂i, θ−i) ≥ 0 as long as γi(θ)− γj(θ) ≥ 0.








denote the optimal EPIC mechanism. First, we prove that
any agent with non-positive virtual value should not be assigned the good in the
optimal EPIC mechanism.
Lemma 12. Under condition-(i) in Lemma 3, if γi(qi, θ) ≤ 0 for any qi, then
qEPi (θ) = 0.
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Proof of Lemma 12. Due to condition-(i), we can find the type θ−i (θ−i) such that
γi(qi, θi, θ−i) ≤ 0 for all qi if and only if θi 4θ−ii θ−i (θ−i). Consider a relaxed problem




i (θ−i), we ignore agent i’s monotonicity constraints involving
(θi, θ−i), and replace the feasibility constraints at (θi, θ−i) by (0, (qj(θi, θ−i)j 6=i) ∈ Q.





i (θ−i). Notice that q
Re





and (qRei (θi, θ−i), (q
Re
j (θi, θ−i))j 6=i) ∈ Q. Then qRe satisfies all the constraints in the





Now we can prove Lemma 3. Let θi, θ
′
i, θ−i and θ
′
−i be the payoff types satisfying
condition-(ii). For θ−i, by condition-(i) we can find the type θ
+
i (θ−i) such that




i (θ−i). By condition-(ii-c),
γj(qj, θ̃i, θ−i) ≤ 0 for all qj and θ̃i. Then by Lemma 12 we have qRej (θ̃i, θ−i) = 0 for
all j 6= i.
It suffices to show that qEPi (θi, θ−i) > 0.
24. Suppose not. Then, by mono-
tonicity, there exists θ̂i θ−ii θi such that qEPi (θ̃i, θ−i) = 0 if θ̃i ≺
θ−i
i θ̂i, and
qEPi (θ̃i, θ−i) > 0 if θ̃i <
θ−i
i θ̂i.





i (θ−i), θ−i) > 0.
25 Because q+i ≤ qEPi (θ̂i, θ−i), we can modify the








i θ̂i (and the other
parts of qEP stays the same as before) without violating any constraint, and hence,
this modified mechanism is an EPIC mechanism. However, it is strictly better than





−i) > 0 can be similarly shown by a symmetric argument
25 Because γi(qi, θ
+









i (θ−i), θ−i) > 0.
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In conclusion, θi, θ
′
i, θ−i and θ
′
−i satisfy the requirement in Assumption 3.
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